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Abstract
This paper evaluates the global welfare impact of observed levels of migration using a quantitative
multi-sector model of the world economy calibrated to aggregate and firm-level data. Our
framework features cross-country labor productivity differences, international trade, remittances,
and a heterogeneous workforce. We compare welfare under the observed levels of migration to a
no-migration counterfactual. In the long run, natives in countries that received a lot of migration—
such as Canada or Australia—are better off due to greater product variety available in consumption
and as intermediate inputs. In the short run, the impact of migration on average welfare in these
countries is close to zero, while the skilled and unskilled natives tend to experience welfare changes
of opposite signs. The remaining natives in countries with large emigration flows—such as Jamaica or
El Salvador—are also better off due to migration, but for a different reason: remittances. The welfare
impact of observed levels of migration is substantial, at about 5% to 10% for the main receiving
countries and about 10% in countries with large incoming remittances. (JEL: F12, F15, F22, F24)
1. Introduction
International migration has risen steadily over the last three decades. By the 2000s,
substantial fractions of the total population in many receiving countries were foreign-
born. For instance, immigrants account for 8%–12% of the population in several G7
countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, and some 20%
of the population in other wealthy countries such as Australia, Canada, and New
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Zealand. By the same token, some developing countries have lost a substantial fraction
of their population to emigration. Emigrants account for some 10% of the population of
Mexico, and as much as 20%–30% in smaller countries such as El Salvador or Jamaica.
The sheer scale of the cross-border movements of people has led to a growing
interest in understanding their welfare effects. However, compared to the attention paid
to the welfare analysis of international trade, very few estimates of the welfare effects
of international migration are available. This paper provides a quantitative assessment
of the global welfare impact of the observed levels of migration on both origin and
destination countries, taking explicitly into account the consequences of international
trade and remittances. Our multi-country general equilibrium model is calibrated to
match the world income distribution and world trade patterns. It incorporates several
first-order features of the world economy that are important for obtaining reliable
estimates of the welfare impact of migration. First, we calibrate labor productivity
differences between and within countries. In order to develop reliable estimates of
migrants’ impact on the host economies, our framework accounts for a great deal of
worker heterogeneity, with worker productivity varying by skill level, country of origin,
and country of residence. In addition, we match the levels of remittances observed in
the data. Remittances transfer some of the gains from the increased productivity of
migrants back to the natives that remained in the home country.
Second, our model incorporates the insights of the recent literature on firm
heterogeneity under monopolistic competition (e.g., Melitz 2003). In recent years,
a great deal of evidence has shown that these models are highly successful at
replicating both the key macro features (total trade flows, the gravity relationship)
and key micro features (firm size distributions, systematically larger exporters) of the
economy, making them especially suitable for quantitative analysis. Economically, the
key mechanism linking migration and welfare in this framework is product variety.
Inflows of immigrants increase market size, and thus the range of varieties available
for consumption and as intermediate inputs. Importantly, in the presence of large labor
productivity differences between countries, the impact of migration on equilibrium
variety depends not only on changes in population, but also the size of the productivity
gap between source and destination countries.
Third, we take explicit account of the role of goods trade in affecting the gains from
migration. In our model an increase in a country’s market size due to immigration will
affect other countries through an increase in export variety. To capture the quantitative
importance of this effect, the model features both traded and nontraded sectors with
intermediate input linkages between the two, and matches the overall levels of goods
trade relative to GDP. The model is solved on a sample of 60 developed and developing
countries comprising some 98% of world GDP, taking into account all the multilateral
trade relationships between them.
Finally, we distinguish between the short-run and the long-run impact of migration.
In the short-run equilibrium, the set of potential varieties available in the economy is
fixed, and thus it corresponds to the framework of Chaney (2008) and Eaton, Kortum,
and Kramarz (2011). In this case, migration has an impact on product variety by
affecting the entry and exit decisions of only the marginal firms (i.e., those near the
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productivity cutoff for operating a firm). Since these are the least productive firms
in the economy, their economic impact is very limited. In the long-run equilibrium,
the set of potential varieties will change in response to migration to dissipate net
aggregate profits (free entry) as in Krugman (1980) and Melitz (2003). Because some
of those new firms will be quite productive, they can have a large impact on welfare.
Thus, the difference in the welfare impact of migration between the short and the long
run depends crucially on the relative productivity of the marginal firms compared to
the inframarginal ones. Our quantitative analysis calibrates the key parameters of the
model that determine equilibrium variety in both the short and the long run: relative
country size and the firm size distribution.1
The main use of our calibrated model is to compute welfare in the baseline under
the observed levels of bilateral migration and in the counterfactual scenario in which
global migration is undone. Our findings can be summarized as follows. In the long
run, the average natives in practically every receiving country would have been worse
off in the absence of migration, and this welfare loss increases in the observed share of
the nonnative population. Natives in the countries with the largest stocks of immigrants
relative to population (such as Australia, New Zealand, and Canada) have 5%–10%
higher welfare under the current levels of migration compared to the no-migration coun-
terfactual. This welfare effect is driven by the general equilibrium response of domestic
variety. A lower population in the absence of migration implies a smaller equilibrium
mass of varieties available in the home market, and thus lower per capita welfare.
In the short run, the welfare impact of immigration on the receiving countries is
much smaller, at less than 0.5% on average, and not always positive. This is because
the general equilibrium effect of increased variety is only of limited importance in the
short run. At the same time, the welfare impacts of migration on the skilled and the
unskilled are frequently of opposite signs, and tend to be an order of magnitude larger
than the overall impact. Thus, in the short run, the main welfare impact of migration on
receiving countries is distributional, and driven by the changes in the relative supply of
skills associated with migration. This distributional impact is limited in the long run,
as the increased variety effect predominates and the welfare changes of the two skill
groups tend to be similar.
For the sending countries, the welfare impact on the staying natives depends on
a tradeoff. Symmetrically to the main migration receiving countries, these source
countries would ceteris paribus be better off without emigration because a larger
labor force implies greater variety in production and consumption. However, absent
emigration, there would be no remittances. For countries such as El Salvador or the
1. Our quantitative framework features a (long-run) scale effect. That is, other things equal, a larger labor
force increases per capita welfare in the long run. Online Appendix B.3 presents a detailed treatment of both
the relevance and the quantitative importance of the scale effect in our model. First, it reviews the existing
empirical literature on the scale effect, and provides a comparison of the size and nature of the scale effect
implied by our model to the available empirical estimates. Though our model is not calibrated to match the
observed magnitude of the scale effect, the model-implied scale effect is in line with the existing empirical
estimates. Second, it reports alternative welfare results under a weaker scale effect corresponding to the
bottom of the range of estimates found in the literature.
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Philippines, where remittances account for more than 10% of GDP, the latter effect
dominates and the average native stayer is about 10% better off under the current levels
of migration. Underlying these results is the fact that the typical migrant moves from a
low to a high TFP region, leading to an overall increase in the efficiency units of labor
worldwide. Part of the welfare benefit of that reallocation is enjoyed by the native
stayers through remittances. However, the remittance effect is not always larger than
the general equilibrium variety effect. Some important emigration countries, such as
Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, and Turkey, would actually be 1%–5% better off in the
no-migration counterfactual.
For the sending countries, the short-run impact tends to be similar to the long-run
impact. This is because for these countries welfare changes are driven primarily by the
loss of remittances, which is the first-order effect in both the short and the long run.
By the same token, the distributional impact of migration is also limited in the sending
countries, as the impact of emigration on the skill premium is small compared to the
remittance effect.
The finding that the receiving countries are better off with immigration may seem
unappealing because it appears at odds with the widespread opposition to immigration
in high-income countries. However, observed opposition to migration is not evidence
against our approach. First of all, even within the model, the receiving countries
are better off only in the long run. In the short run, there is nothing in our model
that guarantees gains from immigration. Thus, it could be that political opposition is
driven by the short-run considerations. Second, our framework features distributional
effects, that are especially pronounced in the short run. In many countries, the unskilled
experience short-run welfare losses due to immigration, and thus would be expected to
oppose it.2 Finally, the fact that restrictive migration policies are observed in the data
is by no means evidence that those policies are welfare improving, much less optimal.
Indeed, there is generally no presumption that observed economic policies are optimal,
in any area of economic activity.
The seminal early treatment of the welfare consequences of migration is Berry
and Soligo (1969). The existing literature on the quantitative welfare impact of
migration has focused almost exclusively on the implications of cross-country labor
productivity differences in a neoclassical framework with a fixed set of goods. Hamilton
and Whalley (1984), Klein and Ventura (2007, 2009), Benhabib and Jovanovic
(2012), and Docquier, Machado, and Sekkat (2012) develop analyses of this type
in one-sector models without international trade. Davis and Weinstein (2002) and
Kennan (2013) investigate the welfare effects of migration in the presence of labor-
augmenting productivity differences in Ricardian and Heckscher–Ohlin models of
trade, respectively. The key consequence of employing a neoclassical framework is that
2. For work on the determinants of immigration restrictions see Benhabib (1996), Ortega (2005, 2010),
Facchini, Mayda, and Mishra (2011), or Facchini and Steinhardt (2011). For empirical work on individual
attitudes toward immigration see Mayda (2006) and Facchini and Mayda (2009), and Ortega and Polavieja
(2012) in the European context.
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immigration always weakly reduces the welfare of the native workers (i.e., suppliers
of the labor input) in the receiving countries.
Our framework incorporates the driving force in these studies—labor productivity
differences. The main departure of our analysis from the neoclassical migration
literature is endogenous product variety. This is the key feature qualitatively as well
as quantitatively, because it opens the possibility that immigration may improve the
native workers’ welfare. To our knowledge, the only existing study of migration with
endogenous product variety is by Iranzo and Peri (2009a), who explore migration
between Eastern and Western Europe in a two-country model. Our paper shares with
Iranzo and Peri (2009a) the emphasis on market size and endogenous variety, but differs
from it in several important respects. First and foremost, our model features bilateral
remittances, which we show to be crucial for evaluating the overall welfare effect of
migration in a number of sending countries. While both studies find that welfare in the
emigration country is higher in the migration equilibrium, the mechanism is different:
in Iranzo and Peri (2009a) the main reason is the increase in imported varieties, in
our analysis it is mainly due to remittances. Second, our framework is implemented
on 60 countries, and incorporates many important aspects of the world economy, such
as heterogeneous country-pair specific trade costs, a nontraded sector, and two-way
input–output linkages, among others. This allows for both greater realism, as well as a
range of outcomes on how migration affects a wide variety of countries depending on
their characteristics. And third, our analysis distinguishes between the short-run and
the long-run effects of migration.
More broadly, our paper complements the small but growing empirical literature
on the firm-level responses to migration and remittances. Lewis (2011) finds that
unskilled immigration led to significantly lower rates of adoption of new automation
techniques that substitute for unskilled labor. Using data on the universe of German
firms, Dustmann and Glitz (2014) find that migration led to an increase in the size
of firms that use the abundant factor more intensively, to a greater adoption of
production technologies that rely on the more abundant factor, and to firm entry.
Yang (2008) finds a positive effect of remittances on the number of household
entrepreneurs in the Philippines. Our analysis shares with these papers the emphasis
on the interaction between migration and firm decisions, but focuses on the general
equilibrium perspective in which migration affects firm entry and exit through changes
in overall size of the market and the labor force.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the migration
and remittance data sources, and describes the basic patterns. Section 3 presents the
theoretical framework, while Section 4 discusses the quantitative implementation of the
model economy. Section 5 presents counterfactual experiments and the main welfare
results. Section 6 discusses extensions and sensitivity, and Section 7 concludes.
2. Migration and Remittances: Data Sources and Basic Patterns
To construct the labor force disaggregated by skill level, origin, and destination country
we rely on two sources: the aggregate migration stocks for the year 2006 from the
OECD International Migration Database and the data for the year 2000 on the labor
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force for each country in the world by education level, origin, and destination produced
by Docquier, Lowell, and Marfouk (2009) and Docquier et al. (2010a). The OECD
International Migration Database contains information on the stocks of immigrants by
both destination and origin country. We use data for 2006, the most recent year these
data are available with comprehensive coverage. An important feature of these data
is that they only contain information on 26 OECD destination countries. Thus, while
we have data on nearly all origin countries, we only have immigration information
for rich country destinations. As a result, strictly speaking, our counterfactual exercise
analyzes the consequences of undoing migration to developed countries. Any migration
to developing countries will be left unchanged.3
The shares of skilled individuals among migrants in 2000 (for ages 25 and above)
by origin and destination country are sourced from Docquier et al. (2010a), and the
shares of skilled among the native stayers from Docquier, Lowell, and Marfouk (2009).
These shares are then applied to the 2006 aggregate migration stocks for each origin–
destination country pair. Skilled individuals are those that completed at least one year
of college.4 Remittances data are sourced from Ratha and Shaw (2007).
To calibrate the parameters governing the relative demand for skilled labor in
production in each country we estimate skill premia following the approach of
Docquier, ¨Ozden, and Peri (2010b). First, we use the Barro and Lee (2010) data
to compute the average years of education in the two skill groups (individuals with
some college education and individuals without) for each country in our sample for
the year 2005.5 Second, to compute the country skill premium we multiply the gap in
average years of schooling between the two groups by the country-specific return to a
year of schooling. Hendricks (2004) has collected Mincerian returns to schooling for
a large set of countries that were estimated from micro data.6 The median return per
3. The OECD DIOC-E database contains information on immigrants to both developing and developed
countries. The disadvantage of these data is that they are only available up to the year 2000. We made the
choice to use the most recent data, at the cost of not being able to evaluate migration into the non-OECD.
The reason we took this route was the large migration inflows experienced by the European countries
post-2000. For Europe in particular, using data for 2000 would mean that we are missing a large share of
current migration. In the 2000 data, the receiving countries in our analysis account for 47% of the global
stock of cross-border migrants. The new borders erected after the collapse of the Soviet Union are partly
responsible for the high observed migration into the non-OECD. Excluding the former Soviet Union our
receiving countries account for 55% of the global migrant stock.
4. There is a small discrepancy in how the two datasets define a skilled individual. Namely, a skilled
native stayer is defined in Docquier, Lowell, and Marfouk (2009) as someone who completed college,
rather than had some college. We do not believe this discrepancy to have a material impact on the results.
5. There is a great deal of variation in the average years of schooling among the unskilled workers
across countries. In the United States the average years of schooling among individuals that did not attend
college was 10.95. The cross-country variation in this variable is from 1.01 (Mali) to 12.80 years (Czech
Republic). By contrast, among the skilled the cross-country variation in the years of schooling is much
smaller, ranging from 14.15 to 15.94 in the Barro and Lee (2010) data.
6. We try to use estimates based on 1995 data, which is the most recent period reported by Hendricks
(2004). If the Mincerian coefficient estimate is not available for a country we follow Docquier, ¨Ozden, and
Peri (2010b) and impute that value on the basis of estimates from neighboring countries with similar levels
of income per capita.
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year of schooling in these data is 7.3%, and the 10th and 90th percentiles are 4.2% and
12.6%. The 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles for the wage skill premium we obtain are
26%, 43%, and 106%.
We carry out the analysis on the sample of the largest 49 countries in the world by
total GDP, plus a selection of eleven smaller countries that have experienced migration
outflows of 10% or more of the native labor force. These 60 countries together cover
98% of world GDP. There is a 61st, rest-of-the-world category. We exclude the entrepoˆt
economies of Hong Kong and Singapore, both of which have total trade well in excess
of their GDP due to significant re-exporting activity, and place them into the rest-of-
the-world category. The sources and details for the other data used in the quantitative
exercise are described when we discuss the calibration.
Table 1 lists the OECD countries in the sample and reports the share of immigrants
(foreign-born), the share of emigrants, the counterfactual population change, the size
of net remittances relative to GDP, and the share of skilled workers among stayers,
immigrants, and emigrants. These are the countries for which data on immigrant stocks
for 2006 are available.7 Table 2 reports the shares of emigrants and remittances as a
share of GDP for the non-OECD countries. The population change in the counterfactual
in the non-OECD coincides with the share of emigrants.
Several points are worth noting. First, the data reveal a great deal of dispersion
in immigration and emigration shares. At one extreme there are countries such as
Australia and New Zealand, where 25% of the population are foreign-born. At the
other, El Salvador, Trinidad and Tobago, and Jamaica display emigration shares in
the 20%–30% range.8 Second, some of the OECD countries have large gross stocks
of both immigrants and emigrants. As a result, if migration had never taken place
their population would be roughly the same (the third column). Ireland is the clearest
example: its share of immigrants is 13%, but the share of emigrants is 16%. In a world
without migration, its population would only be 3% higher.
The table also reports the net remittances in each country as a share of GDP.
Negative values mean that a country is a net sender of remittances. Clearly, most
OECD countries send more remittances than they receive, but the total net remittances
are only a small share of GDP, ranging from 1% (Australia) to C1% (Portugal).
In contrast, remittances are large relative to GDP for several non-OECD countries.
For instance, Colombia, India, Mexico, and Nigeria report remittances of 3% of GDP.
However, these are small compared to Jamaica (20%), Serbia and Montenegro (19.1%),
El Salvador (17.8%), the Philippines (15.5%) and the Dominican Republic (14.3%).
Hence, for these countries it will be important to take remittances into account when
evaluating the welfare impact of migration.
7. Throughout the paper we use the shorthand “OECD” to refer to the group of the 26 countries for which
immigration data are available in our database, and “non-OECD” to describe the rest of the country sample.
The “OECD” group is predominantly the wealthy, net immigration countries. Formally, the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development has additional member countries, such as Mexico and Turkey.
8. Once again, for these countries we are reporting data on emigration to OECD countries only. In the
counterfactual these countries only experience a return of their emigrants, but not the exit of the immigrants
residing in these countries.
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TABLE 2. Non-OECD countries: migrant stocks, skill composition, and remittances.
Share Remittances Share skilled Share skilled
Country emigrants /GDP stayers emigrants
Algeria 0.025 0.023 0.062 0.147
Argentina 0.012 0.004 0.201 0.408
Belarus 0.005 0.001 0.201 0.172
Brazil 0.005 0.005 0.084 0.328
Bulgaria 0.037 0.082 0.189 0.234
Chile 0.016 0.002 0.158 0.403
China 0.003 0.012 0.026 0.281
Colombia 0.023 0.034 0.099 0.317
Croatia 0.103 0.020 0.094 0.199
Dominican Rep. 0.097 0.143 0.141 0.256
Ecuador 0.068 0.050 0.160 0.266
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.004 0.042 0.104 0.271
El Salvador 0.190 0.178 0.107 0.198
India 0.003 0.030 0.047 0.318
Indonesia 0.002 0.007 0.050 0.182
Iran, Islamic Rep. 0.011 0.006 0.067 0.487
Israel 0.021 0.023 0.241 0.235
Jamaica 0.317 0.200 0.040 0.420
Malaysia 0.010 0.006 0.077 0.352
Mexico 0.107 0.031 0.111 0.148
Nigeria 0.003 0.031 0.028 0.313
Pakistan 0.005 0.044 0.025 0.231
Philippines 0.030 0.155 0.159 0.545
Romania 0.070 0.058 0.087 0.334
Russian Fed. 0.008 0.001 0.202 0.309
Saudi Arabia 0.004 0.049 0.093 0.301
Serbia and Mont. 0.106 0.191 0.082 0.230
South Africa 0.011 0.001 0.098 0.510
Thailand 0.006 0.002 0.110 0.296
Trinidad and Tob. 0.179 0.006 0.099 0.494
Turkey 0.038 0.001 0.081 0.092
Ukraine 0.019 0.010 0.162 0.222
UAE 0.003 – 0.031 0.206
Venezuela 0.011 0.004 0.185 0.521
Rest of World 0.011 0.021 0.095 0.118
Notes: This table presents the developing country sample, for which only outward migration data to the developed
countries are available for 2006. Thus, the population change in the counterfactual coincides with the share of
emigrants. The second column presents the share of emigrants from each country to the receiving countries in the
sample relative the remaining population. The third column presents the percentage change in the population if
there were no migration. This is the percentage change in the population evaluated in the counterfactual. The last
column reports net remittances as a share of GDP (negative numbers signify net outflows of remittances). Data
sources and variable definitions are described in detail in the text.
Across all origin–destination pairs, the share of skilled is 0.25, with a standard
deviation of 0.24. There is large heterogeneity in the share of skilled among immigrants
relative to the natives of the host country. For instance, US immigrants are relatively
unskilled, by our measure of educational attainment: 52% of US-born stayers are
di Giovanni, Levchenko, and Ortega A Global View of Cross-Border Migration 177
skilled, compared to 42% of immigrants into the United States. By contrast, in Canada
immigrants are relatively skilled (58%) compared to native stayers (49%).
3. Theoretical Framework
Our framework augments an otherwise standard multicountry heterogeneous firm
model of production and trade with three elements that are crucial for a global
quantitative assessment of the gains from migration: cross-country labor productivity
differences, worker heterogeneity (across skills as well as between natives and
immigrants), and remittances. We consider a monopolistically competitive setup with
endogenous product variety and fixed costs of production and exporting. Production
uses skilled and unskilled labor and intermediate inputs.
3.1. Preferences, Welfare, and Love for Variety
The world is comprised of C countries, indexed by i; j D 1; : : : ; C. In each country
there are two broad sectors, the tradeable T and the nontradeable N . In country i , a
consumer with income yi maximizes
max
fyN
i
.k/;yT
i
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where ysi .k/ is consumption of good k belonging to sector s D N; T in country i ,
psi .k/ is the price of this good, J si is the mass of varieties available in sector s in
country i coming from all countries, and "s is the elasticity of substitution between
varieties in s. Standard steps yield an expression for welfare—that is, the indirect
utility function—of an individual with income yi living in country i ,
Wi .yi / D
yi
PNi
˛ 
P Ti
1˛ ; (1)
where P si is the ideal price index in sector s D N; T in country i ,
P si D
"Z
J s
i
psi .k/
1"
sdk
# 1
1"
s
: (2)
Welfare is thus simply equivalent to real income. In our model, an individual’s
nominal income yi may be composed of (i) labor income, (ii) profits of firms, and (iii)
remittances, though some of these may be zero in some cases. Thus migration will
have an impact on welfare through nominal income to the extent that it affects any
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of these three terms for an individual, either directly or through general equilibrium
effects.
Welfare falls in the consumption price level .PNi /
˛.P Ti /
1˛
. We assume that
"s > 1, s D N; T (Dixit and Stiglitz 1977). The key consequence of this assumption is
that preferences exhibit love for variety: holding nominal expenditure and individual
goods prices fixed, the agent attains higher utility when the set of goods JNi and
J Ti available for consumption increases. Thus, to the extent that migration affects
the equilibrium set of varieties available in economy i , it will have a welfare impact
through that channel as well.
In our framework, incomes differ across individuals within each country. However,
preferences are identical and homothetic, and thus admit a representative consumer.
Total income Yi in country i is the sum of labor income wiLi , net profits (if
any) in the two sectors …Ni C …Ti , and net remittances received from abroad Ri :
Yi D wiLi C …Ni C …Ti C Ri . Since consumer preferences are Cobb–Douglas in
the CES aggregates of N and T , it is well known that consumption expenditure on
sector N is equal to ˛Yi , and on T sector, .1  ˛/Yi .
3.2. Migration, Productivity, and Labor Force Composition
Each country’s labor force is composed of natives and immigrants, who can be unskilled
or skilled, indexed by e D `; h respectively. Denote by N ej i the number of workers with
skill level e born in country i that live in country j (throughout the paper, we adopt
the convention that the first subscript denotes the destination country, and the second
subscript, the source). As in Trefler (1993, 1995), the effective labor endowment is a
combination of the number of people that live in a country and their efficiency units.
We build on this approach by taking explicit account of migration. Workers of skill
level e born in country i and working in country j have Aej i efficiency units of labor.
Skilled and unskilled labor are imperfect substitutes in production. Specifically, the
total effective labor in country j , Lj , is given by the CES aggregate
Lj D
24 CX
iD1
A`j iN
`
j i
!1

C j
 CX
iD1
AhjiN
h
ji
!1

35

1
; (3)
where  is the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor, j captures
the relative importance of skilled labor in production, and, of course, the endowments
of labor of each type include the native workers and their efficiency, AejjN ejj , e D `; h.
This approach to modeling the labor force is flexible enough to capture a number of
features that are important for evaluating the impact of migration. First and foremost,
the framework accommodates the (large) observed cross-country labor productivity
differences through differences in the Aej i . Second, skilled workers are more productive
than unskilled workers. And third, conditional on skill level, immigrants may differ
from native workers in how many efficiency units of labor they possess. To streamline
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notation and link the productivity parameters more transparently to observed wages, it
is useful to denote the skilled–unskilled productivity gap among natives by
Ahjj
A`jj
 j  1; (4)
and native–immigrant productivity gaps for immigrants of origin i ¤ j and skill level e
by
Aej i
Aejj
 'ej i : (5)
The latter feature allows us to account for native–immigrant wage differences
conditional on educational attainment. The quantitative implementation uses several
empirically relevant parameterizations of the productivity differential 'ej i , that can
capture a number of reasons for migrant–native productivity differences, such as
imperfect skill transferability or selection into migration.
Combining (3), (4), and (5), Lj can be rewritten as
Lj D Ajj
24 CX
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'`j iN
`
j i
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
C j
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; (6)
where to simplify notation we relabelled the unskilled native productivity as A`jj D
Ajj , which can be interpreted as the economywide productivity level.
In this framework, immigrants are not the same as natives in two ways that will
condition the impact of immigration. First, the share of skilled among immigrants can
differ from the share of skilled among the natives. Since the skilled and the unskilled are
imperfect substitutes in production, the skill composition of the immigrant population
will have an effect on both the aggregate supply of labor, and on the relative wages of the
skilled compared to the unskilled. Second, immigrants may have different productivity
than the natives within the same skill category. This distinction has an impact on how
much a given stock of foreign-born individuals changes the effective supply of labor
of a particular skill level.
The baseline framework makes a number of simplifying assumptions, some of
which will be relaxed in the extensions. First, immigrant and native labor of the
same skill level are perfect substitutes. Online Appendix B.2 develops an extension in
which immigrants and natives are imperfectly substitutable in production (Manacorda,
Manning, and Wadsworth 2012; Ottaviano and Peri 2012), and shows that the main
results are robust. Second, the productivity terms Aej i , while calibrated to data,
are exogenous. Online Appendix B.4 relaxes this assumption and allows worker
productivity to be a function of the share of skilled in the population (e.g., Jones
2002).
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3.3. Technology
Importantly in our framework, the sets of available goods J Ti and JNi will differ across
countries due to trade costs, and will be affected by migration. The market structure
is monopolistic competition as in Melitz (2003). Each country j is populated by a
mass nsj of entrepreneurs in sector s. Each entrepreneur k in each sector s D N; T and
j D 1; : : : ; C has the ability to produce a unique variety and thus has some market
power. Productivity is heterogeneous: entrepreneur k needs a.k/ input bundles to
produce one unit of its good (thus more productive firms have lower a.k/). Since each
entrepreneur is able to produce only one good with a particular productivity, we use
the terms “entrepreneur” and “project” interchangeably.
Each entrepreneur in country j and sector s must incur a fixed cost f sjj to start
production, and as a result not all entrepreneurs decide to produce. We reserve the
term “firm” for those entrepreneurs that actually undertake production. In sector T , to
start exporting from country j to country i , a firm must pay a fixed cost fij , and an
iceberg per-unit cost of ij > 1, with the iceberg cost of domestic sales normalized to
one: jj D 1. We assume that trade costs are infinite in the nontraded sector, and thus
firms in sector N only sell domestically.
Production uses skilled labor, unskilled labor, and intermediates from sectorsN and
T . The production function is Cobb–Douglas in the labor, T , and N composites. The
labor composite is a CES aggregate of skilled and unskilled workers as in equation (3).
The sector s D N; T composites are CES aggregates of sector s varieties available in
the country. The minimized cost of one unit of the input bundle in country j is given
by
csj D w
ˇ
s
j
h
PNj

s

P Tj
1
s
i1ˇ
s
; (7)
where wj is the composite wage (i.e., the price of one unit of L) in country j , and
P sj is the price of sector s CES composite, given by equation (2). Parameters ˇs
and s correspond, respectively, to the share of labor in total sales and the share of
nontradeable inputs in total input usage in each sector s.
Thus, firm k in sector s from country j has a marginal cost ij csja.k/ of serving
market i . Firms and consumers in country i have a demand for an individual variety k
from sector s that is given by
xsi .k/ D
X si
P si
1"
s
psi .k/
"
s ; (8)
where X si denotes the total spending—final plus intermediate—on sector s in country i .
Productivity heterogeneity combined with fixed costs of production and trade imply
that not all firms will decide to serve all markets. As is well known, profit maximization
yields a price that is a constant markup "s=."s  1/ over marginal cost, and the total
ex-post variable profits from selling to market i are a constant multiple 1="s of revenue.
Given the price level and total spending, there is a cutoff unit input requirement asij
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above which firms in country j do not serve market i . This cutoff is found as the unit
input requirement at which the firm obtains zero profits from serving market i , and is
given by
asij D
"s  1
"s
P si
ij c
s
j
 
X si
"sc
s
jf
s
ij
! 1
"
s
1
: (9)
We adopt the standard assumption that firm productivity in sector s, 1=a, follows
a Pareto .bs; s/ distribution: Pr.1=a < y/ D 1  .bs=y/s , where bs is the minimum
value labor productivity can take, and s regulates dispersion. It is then straightforward
to show that the unit input requirement, a, has a distribution function G.a/ D .bsa/s .
Under this distributional assumption, we can combine equations (2) and (9) to derive
expressions for the price indices:
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where J sij is the set of varieties from country j that gets exported to country i .9
Trade is not balanced because of remittances. Let Ri denote the net remittances
received by country i , which can be positive (for countries receiving remittances), or
negative (for countries sending them).10 Remittance-receiving countries will be able
to afford imports above the value of their exports, while the opposite will be true for
countries with negative net remittances.
9. It is understood that in the nontraded sector N
ij
D 1 8i ¤ j , and thus the summations are in effect
over one nonzero element, j D i .
10. Of course, for the world as a whole, remittances sum to zero:
P
i
R
i
D 0. The data on remittances
used in what follows to implement the model satisfy this requirement.
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3.4. Short-Run and Long-Run Equilibria
In assessing the welfare impact of migration, we consider two types of equilibria. The
two equilibria differ in their assumptions on the mass of projects nsi in each country
and sector.
The short-run equilibrium assumes that the set of projectsnsi is fixed in each country
and sector, as in Chaney (2008) and Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2011), and thus it
cannot adjust to changes in the labor force. A short-run monopolistically competitive
equilibrium is a set of prices fwi ; PNi ; P Ti gCiD1, and factor allocations such that (i)
consumers maximize utility; (ii) firms maximize profits; and (iii) all goods and factor
markets clear, given country endowments Li and nsi .
In the long-run equilibrium, the set of projects nsi is an equilibrium outcome that
responds to changing economic conditions, in our case migration. Each country has
a potentially infinite number of entrepreneurs (projects) with zero outside option. In
order to become an entrepreneur, an agent must pay an “exploration” cost fE . Upon
paying this cost, the entrepreneur k discovers her productivity, indexed by a unit input
requirement a.k/, and develops an ability to produce a unique variety of N or T valued
by consumers and other firms. The equilibrium number of projects nsi is then pinned
down by the familiar free entry condition in each sector and each country, as in Krugman
(1980) and Melitz (2003). A long-run monopolistically competitive equilibrium is a set
of prices fwi ; PNi ; P Ti gCiD1, equilibrium masses of projects fnNi ; nTi gCiD1, and factor
allocations such that (i) consumers maximize utility; (ii) firms maximize profits; (iii)
all goods and factor markets clear; and (iv) the net profits in the economy equal zero,
given country endowments Li 8i .
Online Appendix A.1 presents the complete equations defining both types of
equilibria.
3.5. Mechanisms
Immigration into country i increases Li . In addition to its impact on nominal
wages, immigration will affect the natives’ welfare by changing equilibrium product
variety. The vectors of nsj and the array of cutoffs (9) together determine the set of
varieties offered in each country.11 An increase in the set of varieties available in
country i implies a lower price level and, other things equal, higher utility/real income.
Consumers benefit directly from the variety-induced reduction in the price level, as
well as indirectly through cheaper intermediate inputs available to firms.
However, in the presence of firm heterogeneity not all varieties are equally valuable:
an unproductive variety (higher a.k/) raises welfare by less than a more productive
one. Thus, changes in equilibrium variety due to movements in the asij have a smaller
welfare impact than those coming from changes in the nsj . This is because movements
11. For instance, the measure of domestic varieties available in sector s in country i is equal to ns
i
G.as
ii
/.
Of course, the total variety in the T sector is the sum of domestic and imported varieties.
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in the asij correspond to entry/exit of the least productive firms in the economy, whereas
movements in the nsj result in entry/exit along the entire firm size distribution.
In this respect, the critical difference between the long run and the short run is
that in the long run, the nsj will change in response to migration. In the short run, the
set of projects nsj is fixed. However, even in the short run the set of actual firms that
serve the market—and thus the equilibrium product variety in the economy—will still
change due to migration. This is because generically, not all projects are implemented
in equilibrium, and migration changes the cutoffs asi i /asij for producing and exporting.
Entry and exit do occur in the short run, but they are confined to the marginal firms,
which are the least productive in the economy.
By contrast, in the long run entry/exit of firms will occur along the entire
productivity distribution, rather than only among the least productive firms. A well-
known property of monopolistic competition models with free entry is that nsi increases
in Li : larger countries have a greater set of projects.12 Migration thus affects welfare in
the long run by changing nsi . Natives in countries that end up with larger Li because of
immigration will be better off, all else equal, because immigration will lead to greater
equilibrium variety (see the expressions for the price indices (10)).
International trade will mitigate this effect because changes in the availability of
foreign varieties also have a welfare impact. For instance, suppose that country i loses
workers to country j . As a result, product variety will fall in i and rise in j .13 From
equation (10), it is clear that an increase in foreign nTj will also have a positive impact
on welfare in country i due to an increase in the set of varieties imported from j .
However, due to trade costs increases in foreign nTj are less valuable for country i than
increases in its own nTi and nNi . Thus, while greater imported variety will counteract
the impact of migration on domestically available variety, it will not do so fully, and
the size of this mitigation effect is ultimately a quantitative question. We answer it
in what follows by calibrating the size of the nontraded sector and the trade costs in
the traded sector, and by comparing the main results to an alternative counterfactual
exercise in which the trade channel is turned off.
By contrast, input–output linkages embodied in the cost function (7) will raise the
welfare impact of changes in domestically available varieties, and will thus amplify the
welfare impact of migration. The magnitude of this effect is a quantitative question, and
thus we calibrate the parameters ˇs and s that regulate the strength of input–output
linkages based on observed Input–Output tables.
Finally, though capital is not explicitly in the model, one can follow the
interpretation suggested by Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and Bergin and Corsetti (2008)
that the set of projects available to entrepreneurs is a form of the capital endowment.
12. While the full-fledged, multisector model with unbalanced trade in this paper cannot be used to
show this relationship analytically, di Giovanni and Levchenko (2012, 2013) show the positive relationship
between L
i
and ns
i
in somewhat simpler models with symmetric countries.
13. The exact change in variety in each country will depend on the labor productivity parameters A
ii
and
A
jj
. If we assume that the origin country has lower labor productivity than the destination—as is typically
the case—then there may be a net increase in worldwide product variety.
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TABLE 3. Calibrated parameter values.
Parameter Baseline Source
 3 Ottaviano and Peri (2012)
"s 6 Anderson and van Wincoop (2004)
s 5.3 Axtell (2001): =."  1/ D 1:06
˛ 0.65 Uy, Yi, and Zhang (2013)˚
ˇN ; ˇT
 f0:65; 0:35g 1997 US Benchmark Input–Output Table˚
N ; T
 f0:77; 0:35g
ij 2.30 Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008)
f si i 14.24 The World Bank (2007); normalizing fUS;US
fij 7.20 so that nearly all firms the US produce
fE 34.0 To match 7,000,000 firms in the United States(US Economic Census)
Notes: The details of how these parameters are chosen are described in Online Appendix A.2.
Similarly, the creation of new firms is a form of capital investment. This interpretation
is natural in the sense that these projects are in effect a factor of production without
which workers cannot generate output. Thus, the short-run equilibrium corresponds
to a case in which the other factors of production—nsj here—have not had a chance
to adjust to the new endowment of labor, whereas the long-run equilibrium is the one
that obtains after the adjustment of other factors.
4. Quantitative Implementation and Model Fit
We numerically implement the model laid out in Section 3. We use information
on country sizes, fixed and variable trade costs, and bilateral migration flows and
remittances to solve the model in the baseline scenario—that is, under the observed
levels of migration and remittances. Then in Section 5 we simulate the effects of un-
doing the migration flows observed in the data. That is, we repatriate all immigrants in
the OECD countries back to their countries of origin. Table 3 summarizes the calibrated
parameter values of the model, and Online Appendix A.2 discusses the details of how
the parameters are chosen.
4.1. Labor Productivity Parameters
To complete the implementation of the baseline scenario requires finding the values
of Lj , or equivalently, Ajj . While we have actual data on the numbers of natives
and immigrants N ej i in each origin and destination, Lj is not population per se, but a
combination of the number of workers and the efficiency units—or labor productivity—
possessed by workers in country j (Section 3.2).
To find Lj we follow the approach of Alvarez and Lucas (2007). Starting with
an initial guess for Lj for all j D 1; : : : ; C, we solve the full model in the long-run
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equilibrium. Given the solution for wj , we update our guess for Lj for each country
in order to match the nominal US$ GDP ratio between each country j and the United
States. Using the resulting values of Lj , we solve the model again to obtain the new
set of wages, and iterate to convergence. Thus, our procedure generates vectors wj
and Lj in such a way as to match exactly the relative total GDPs of the countries in the
sample while imposing that the model world economy is in the long-run equilibrium.
Having obtained the total efficiency-adjusted labor endowments Lj , and using the
data on bilateral immigrant stocks by skill for each destination and origin country, we
obtain country-specific productivity Ajj for every country j from equation (6):
Ajj D
LjhPC
iD1 '`j iN `j i
1
 C j

j
PC
iD1 'hjiN hji
1

i 
1
: (11)
Intuitively, this procedure infers productivity from total country GDPs and the labor
force composition of each country. Section 4.2 checks that the resulting productivity
estimates are plausible. A notable consequence of this approach is that, controlling for
population, countries with higher labor productivity Ajj will tend to have a greater
number of entrepreneurs nsj , all else equal, since our procedure will give them a
higher Lj .14
The previous calculation requires assigning values to (i) the term j1=j , and
(ii) 'ej i . We calibrate j1=j using skill premia. Optimal factor usage implies the
following relationship:
whj
w`j
D j
1

j
 PC
iD1 'hjiN hjiPC
iD1 '`j iN `j i
! 1

;
where wej is the wage of the worker of skill level e D `; h. Using country-
specific data on the skill premium whj =w`j described in Section 2 as well as the
population composition by skill
PC
iD1 'hjiN hji and
PC
iD1 '`j iN `j i allows us to back
out the combination j
1=
j of the skill share parameter and the skilled worker’s
productivity advantage. This procedure ensures that the baseline equilibrium matches
perfectly the observed skill premium in each country.
On 'ej i , we adopt three approaches. The first is to assume that '`j i D 'hji D 1,
common across all countries. In this case, the average equilibrium wages of natives
and immigrants with the same skill level will be equal within each country (although
they will of course differ across countries). This will be our baseline scenario as we
find it helpful in conveying the main mechanisms driving our results. It corresponds
14. That is, population and efficiency enter symmetrically and multiplicatively in determining market
size, which in turn determines equilibrium variety. This approach is common in the literature. For instance,
Alvarez and Lucas (2007) and Chaney (2008) assume that the number of productivity draws is a constant
multiple of L
j
.
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TABLE 4. Bilateral trade shares: data and model predictions.
Model Data
Domestic sales as a share of domestic absorption (i i )
mean 0.7559 0.7286
median 0.7468 0.7697
corr(model,data) 0.5662
Export sales as a share of domestic absorption (ij )
mean 0.0041 0.0042
median 0.0018 0.0042
corr(model,data) 0.7822
Notes: This table reports the means and medians of domestic output (top panel), and bilateral trade (bottom
panel), both as a share of domestic absorption, in the model and in the data.
Source: International Monetary Fund (2007) and model output.
to the broad pattern in the data that the wages of migrants are well approximated by
the wages of the natives in the host country, and are often an order of magnitude larger
than wages of similar workers in the source country (Pritchett 2006).
We check the robustness of the results to two alternative calibrations of f'ej ig. The
first captures a plausible amount of imperfect cross-border transferability of skills.
The second allows for origin-specific native–immigrant productivity gaps that reflect
migrant selection (positive or negative), or differences in the quality of education
across countries. The results and a more detailed discussion are in Section 6 and
Online Appendix B.1.
4.2. Model Fit
Before describing the counterfactual results, we assess the model fit on overall and
bilateral trade, as well as on how the total labor productivities implied by the model
compare to GDP per capita at the country level. The baseline is solved as the long-run
equilibrium given the population compositions, total GDPs, and remittances in all
countries as they are in the data in 2006.
Table 4 compares the bilateral and overall trade volumes in the model and in the
data. Note that since in the data we only have bilateral trade as a share of GDP, not
of total sales, we compute the same object in the model: ij D Xij =wiLi .15 This
captures both the distinction between trade, which is recorded as total value, and GDP,
which is recorded as value added—as well as the fact that there is a large nontraded
sector in both the model and in the data.
The top panel of the table compares the share of domestically produced goods in
GDP, i i , which is one minus imports/GDP, and can be thought of as the opposite of
trade openness. It is clear that the overall trade volumes implied by the model match
the actual data well. The means and medians are similar, and the correlation between
15. Since the baseline is solved as the long-run equilibrium, total profits are zero and GDP is simply
labor income.
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i i calculated from the model and those in the data for this sample of countries
is around 0.57. The bottom panel compares bilateral trade shares ij , i ¤ j . The
average levels are quite similar, and the correlation between model and data bilateral
trade shares is actually higher at 0.78. Since we use estimated gravity coefficients
together with the actual data on bilateral country characteristics to compute trade
costs, it is not surprising that our model fits bilateral trade data quite well given the
success of the empirical gravity relationship. Nonetheless, since the gravity estimates
we use come from outside of our calibration procedure, it is important to check that
our model delivers outcomes similar to observed trade volumes.
The model delivers a vector of implied baseline labor productivities Ajj for each
country, and we would like to compare these estimates to the data. Unfortunately, as
a model object Ajj reflects the physical productivity of a worker, which we cannot
measure in the data. In addition, in the model wages of a single efficiency unit of labor,
wj , will differ across countries to ensure global market clearing. To match the model
precisely with the data, we calculate in the model the real PPP-adjusted per capita
income for an individual living in j , which is given by
wjLj
Pj
P
i
P
eD`;h N ej i
;
with Pj D .PNj /˛.P Tj /1˛ the consumption price level, and
P
i
P
eD`;h N ej i simply
the total population of country j . This object is then directly comparable to income
data from the Penn World Tables. Figure 1 presents the scatterplot of the real PPP-
adjusted per capita income for 2006 from the Penn World Tables on the x-axis
against the corresponding object in the model, along with the 45-degree line. The
model matches the broad variation in per capita income in our sample of countries
quite well. The countries line up along the 45-degree line, though it appears that the
model tends to underpredict the relative income levels of poorer countries, and slightly
overpredict the relative income levels of the richest countries. Overall, however, both
the simple correlation and the Spearman rank correlation between the model and the
data are 0.94.16
5. Counterfactuals
Our counterfactual experiments evaluate the welfare effects of sending all foreign-born
individuals currently living in the OECD countries back to their countries of birth. In
16. The plots and the correlations are reported dropping the United Arab Emirates (UAE), for which
the model underpredicts real per capita income by about a factor of 2. The UAE is a very small, special
economy for which we do not have immigration data, and thus the poor performance of the model regarding
the UAE is highly unlikely to affect any of the substantive results in the paper. Including the UAE, the
simple correlation between the model and the data is 0.91, and the Spearman correlation is still 0.94.
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FIGURE 1. Real incomes: model versus data. This figure reports the scatterplot of the real PPP-
adjusted per capita income from the Penn World Tables (x-axis) against the real PPP-adjusted per
capita income implied by the model. Both are expressed relative to the United States.
the counterfactual scenario effective labor endowments of each country j will be
eLj D Ajj
24 CX
iD1
N `ij
!1

C j
 
j
CX
iD1
N hij
!1

35

1
: (12)
That is, all the workers native to j that ever migrated to any destination country i
are returned home. Their labor productivity is assumed to be the same as for their
compatriots with the same skill, regardless of whether and where they migrated.17
Our main measure of welfare is the average utility of native stayers, taking into
account the distribution of skill levels among them.18 Individual welfare is given by
equation (1). In the baseline equilibrium the welfare of the native stayers (born and
residing in j ) is given by
Wjj D
.1  !jj /w`j C !jjwhj C

…Nj C …Tj

=
P
eD`;h
PC
kD1 N ejk C Rinj =Njj
PNj
˛
P Tj
1˛ ;
17. In reality, return migrants may bring back skills learned at the destination country. However, there
are very few estimates available for the rates of return to those skills. For more details see Dustmann (2003,
2008) and Dustmann, Fadlon, and Weiss (2011). See also Rauch and Trindade (2002, 2003) for estimates
of the effects of migration on enhancing trade flows via the information conveyed through ethnic networks.
18. Online Appendix B.6 reports estimates of the welfare changes for the migrants themselves.
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where, as previously, wej is the wage of a native-born individual of skill level e,
!jj  N hjj =.N `jj C N hjj / is the share of skilled among the natives, Njj D N `jj C N hjj
is the total population of natives,
P
eD`;h
PC
kD1 N ejk is the total population of
country j , and Rinj is the total gross amount of remittances received by country
j .19
This expression for welfare thus makes an assumption on remittances and an
assumption on the distribution of firm profits. On remittances, we assume that (i)
outgoing remittances are sent by the migrants only, that is, natives living in their
home country are not transferring any of their income abroad; and that (ii) incoming
remittances are received by the native stayers only, that is, remittances from abroad
coming into the country go to natives, and not to immigrants living in that country.20
On profits, we assume that all residents of a country have an equal number of shares
in domestic profits, regardless of their skill level or country of birth.21 This is a strong
assumption, but it only matters in the short run. In the long run, profits are zero due to
free entry.
In the counterfactual scenario each country’s population is composed of the
individuals that were born in that country, including both those that never left and
returnees. The expressions for individual welfare in the counterfactual equilibrium
are analogous to the previous expressions, with the proviso that there are no longer
any remittances. Hence, the counterfactual individual welfare of a native stayer in
country j is given by
eW jj D .1  !jj / Qw`j C !jj Qwhj C
 Q…Nj C Q…Tj =PCkD1 Nkj QPNj ˛. QP Tj /1˛ ; (13)
where the tilde denotes the counterfactual equilibrium values.
The change in the average welfare of natives between the baseline and the no-
migration scenarios is closely related to the concept of the immigration surplus,
defined as the change in the real average income of natives caused by an inflow
19. Recall that R
j
was used to denote the total net remittances received by country j from the rest of
the world, which can take both positive and negative values.
20. For example, remittances from Mexicans working in the United States are received by native Mexicans
living in Mexico, and not by Guatemalan immigrants living in Mexico or by Mexicans living in Spain. We
lack data to evaluate the plausibility of this assumption but it appears reasonable and unlikely to bias the
results.
21. We are not aware of a good empirical benchmark that directly speaks to the question of the immigrants’
share of a country’s total profits. However, it is helpful to compare the entrepreneurship rates of natives
and immigrants. Fairlie (2012) reports a higher business ownership rate among immigrants (10.5%) than
among natives (9.3%) in the United States. Likewise the startup rate is also higher for immigrants than
for non-immigrants (0.62% versus 0.28%). However, these figures are likely to overestimate the share of
profits accruing to immigrants because immigrant-owned businesses tend to be smaller than native-owned
ones. According to Fairlie (2012) immigrant-owned businesses have about 30% lower revenue. In light of
these numbers it appears reasonable to allocate aggregate profits to natives and immigrants in proportion
to their population shares.
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of immigrants (Berry and Soligo 1969; Borjas 1995). Virtually all studies that quantify
the immigration surplus employ a one-good framework and a standard neoclassical
production function. In our framework each firm produces a different good and product
variety is endogenous. In this context income is deflated by the ideal price index, which
encapsulates the impact of changes in product variety on firms and consumers. But it
is still the case that real income per native, our main welfare criterion, coincides with
the immigration surplus also in per-native terms.
5.1. The Long Run
Table 5 reports our main results. For each country, we report the percent change in the
real average income of native stayers (across the two skill levels) in the no-migration
counterfactual relative to the benchmark scenario. Negative values thus represent
welfare losses from undoing international migration. We break up the sample into the
OECD and the non-OECD countries. Roughly, we can think of the OECD group (left
panel) as the migrant-receiving countries and the non-OECD group (right panel) as the
migrant-sending countries, though keeping in mind that there is substantial migration
within the OECD as well.
The first important observation is that in the long run the large majority of OECD
countries would be worse off in the absence of migration. The average OECD country
would experience a welfare change of 2:38%, with substantial dispersion in outcomes
(standard deviation of 3.07%). In this group, the largest losses are experienced by the
natives of the countries with the largest observed shares of the foreign-born in the
population: Australia (11:63%), Canada (7:07%), and New Zealand (6:89%).
However, it is worth noting that a handful of OECD countries would experience
welfare gains: Greece, Korea, and Portugal would all be about 1.1%–1.4% better off
in the no-migration counterfactual. As Table 1 shows, these are the OECD countries
with noticeable net out-migration. In the no-migration counterfactual these countries’
population would rise by 5.2%, 2.8%, and 11.1%, respectively.
Second, the majority of non-OECD countries also have lower welfare in the
no-migration counterfactual, although dispersion in country outcomes is substantial.
The average welfare change is 2:00% with an associated standard deviation of
3.55%. The highest welfare losses are to native stayers in El Salvador, the Dominican
Republic, Jamaica, and the Philippines, at around 7% to 10%. Interestingly, a
handful of non-OECD countries experience welfare gains: mainly, Trinidad and Tobago
(5:70%), Mexico (1:32%), and Turkey (1:07%). A quick glance at Table 2 shows that
these countries are characterized by substantial emigration rates but small incoming
remittances relative to their GDP and to their emigration rates. For instance, while
Mexico has an emigration rate over 10%, remittances amount to only 3.1% of its
GDP. In contrast, the emigration rate of the Philippines is around 3% but the incoming
remittances are equal to 15.5% of its GDP.22
22. However, it is also important to qualify the impact of cross-country variation in incoming remittances.
In our framework remittances are exogenous and taken directly from the data. As such, our analysis is
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TABLE 5. Percentage change in average welfare in the counterfactual relative to benchmark.
OECD countries Non-OECD countries
Country Long run Short run Country Long run Short run
Australia 11.63 0.68 Algeria 1.55 2.14
Austria 3.06 0.41 Argentina 0.07 0.19
Belgium 4.63 1.36 Belarus 1.25 1.03
Canada 7.07 0.25 Brazil 0.27 0.43
Czech Republic 1.02 0.85 Bulgaria 5.68 6.60
Denmark 1.29 0.31 Chile 0.34 0.11
Finland 0.13 0.55 China 0.75 0.88
France 3.12 0.39 Colombia 2.01 2.75
Germany 1.55 0.09 Croatia 0.35 3.29
Greece 1.17 0.59 Dominican Republic 9.02 11.55
Hungary 0.46 0.12 Ecuador 2.26 4.42
Ireland 0.07 0.54 Egypt, Arab Rep. 3.47 3.40
Italy 0.43 0.15 El Salvador 8.72 14.08
Japan 0.48 0.01 India 2.51 2.53
Korea, Rep. 1.12 0.01 Indonesia 0.65 0.63
Netherlands 2.60 0.12 Iran, Islamic Rep. 0.15 0.53
New Zealand 6.89 1.21 Israel 0.12 0.04
Norway 2.53 0.05 Jamaica 5.61 14.89
Poland 0.16 1.32 Malaysia 0.39 0.43
Portugal 1.37 2.04 Mexico 1.32 2.59
Slovak Republic 0.10 1.10 Nigeria 2.74 2.59
Spain 4.91 0.42 Pakistan 3.45 3.45
Sweden 3.45 0.15 Philippines 10.08 11.27
Switzerland 4.42 0.06 Romania 2.73 4.89
United Kingdom 1.46 0.23 Russian Federation 0.18 0.38
United States 5.37 0.14 Saudi Arabia 0.26 0.66
Serbia and Montenegro 11.54 14.46
South Africa 0.05 0.31
Thailand 0.51 0.56
Trinidad and Tobago 5.70 0.77
Turkey 1.07 0.30
Ukraine 0.34 0.58
United Arab Emirates 0.06 0.07
Venezuela, RB 0.10 0.14
Mean 2.38 0.46 Mean 2.00 3.28
Std Dev. 3.07 0.56 Std Dev. 3.55 4.54
Notes: This table presents the percent change in welfare between baseline and counterfactual equilibria, assuming
'`
i
D 'h
i
D 1 for all countries. The measure of welfare employed here is the average real income of native
stayers. The first column reports the welfare change in the long run, the second column in the short run.
silent on why remittances, conditional on emigrant stocks, vary across countries. It could be that in some
countries entire families emigrate, while in others families are split and only one family member goes
abroad. These patterns have clear implications for remittance flows (Merkle and Zimmermann 1992), but
will also presumably have a direct and unmodeled impact on the disutility from emigration if people value
living in the same location as their family.
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FIGURE 2. Change in average welfare in the long run: autarky, trade, and remittances. This figure
reports the percentage change in welfare in the long-run counterfactual relative to the baseline
(assuming '`i D 'hi D 1 for all countries i ) in three different scenarios. Solid dots depict the welfare
change with both trade and remittances. Hollow dots depict the welfare change with international
trade but keeping remittances constant at zero in the baseline and counterfactual equilibria. Hollow
triangles depict the welfare changes under prohibitive trade costs and no remittances. The measure
of welfare is the average real income of native stayers. On the y-axis is the percent change in the
population in the counterfactual relative to the baseline.
Thus, both developed and developing countries tend to gain from the observed
levels of migration. In the OECD, net immigration leads to a larger market size. In
the presence of positive trade costs, this implies higher equilibrium variety and thus
higher per capita welfare. For the native stayers in the non-OECD, the losses from
lower variety due to emigration are in most cases more than offset by the fact that
their emigrants experience large increases in earnings, and a fraction of those is being
shared with the native stayers through remittances.
We now isolate the roles played by changes in population size, international trade,
and remittances. Figure 2 presents these results using scatterplots. On the horizontal
axis is the percentage change in the total population in the counterfactual relative to
the baseline (column 3 of Table 1 and column 1 of Table 2), with positive values
corresponding to increases in population. On the vertical axis is the percentage
change in welfare in the no-migration counterfactual relative to the baseline. Solid
dots depict the long-run welfare change (the first column of Table 5). As discussed
previously, most countries in the OECD suffer a population loss as migrants return to
their home countries, while most non-OECD countries gain population. Among the
OECD countries there is a clear positive association between the population change and
the percentage change in long-run welfare: the countries with the largest population
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losses suffer the largest welfare losses. For instance, Australia would lose 22:6% of
its population, leading to a 11:63% welfare change for its native stayers. The picture
is much less clear for the non-OECD countries. Most of these countries experience
net population gains. However, some suffer large welfare losses while others even
experience (small) welfare gains. It is particularly interesting to compare the predictions
for El Salvador and Trinidad and Tobago. These two countries would experience similar
population gains due to return migration, at 19% and 17:9% respectively. But while the
former would suffer a welfare loss of 8:72%, the latter would experience a welfare
gain of 5:70%. As we now show, the diverging effects of return migration on these two
countries are explained by the role of remittances.
Figure 2 plots the results from two additional counterfactual scenarios. Hollow
dots report the welfare changes that would result assuming there are no remittances.
Strikingly, the relationship between population and welfare changes becomes roughly
monotonically increasing, with a concave shape. In particular, we note that El Salvador
and Trinidad and Tobago would now experience practically the same welfare gain
(about 5%). The key is that remittances are a very large share of income in El Salvador,
but not in Trinidad and Tobago. Note also that for the OECD the welfare impact
remains practically unchanged. This is because the remittances originating in these
countries are very small relative to the countries’ GDPs, and the native stayers are not
the ones sending them abroad.
Next, we examine the scenario where both remittances and international trade are
assumed away. The corresponding welfare changes are depicted by hollow triangles.
The relationship between population and welfare changes becomes practically linear
(with a slope of 0.5), and steeper than under trade. This is because when a developing
country experiences net population growth it will respond by producing a wider set
of varieties. In autarky, consumers in that country clearly benefit from the increase in
variety. However, in the presence of trade the resulting welfare gain is moderated by
the reduction in the number of varieties that are available through imports, implying a
smaller marginal welfare gain.
5.2. The Short Run
The native stayers’ welfare changes in the short run are reported in the second column
of Table 5. Welfare for natives in the OECD is practically unchanged in the short run (an
average change of 0:46%, compared to 2:38% in the long run). In the non-OECD,
all countries would experience a welfare loss (with the exception of Saudi Arabia).
Furthermore, the short-run loss is uniformly larger than the long-run loss (3:28%,
compared to 2:00% in the long run). The intuition for the difference between the
short- and long-run effects is as follows. The typical OECD country experiences a net
reduction in its labor force. As a result, some of the firms operating in the OECD shut
down. In the short run, the set of projects available in the economy is fixed. Hence, the
reduction in the number of firms/varieties is attained by an increase in the productivity
cutoff for operating a firm. As a result, the firms that exit are those with the lowest
productivity. Losing these marginal varieties has practically no effect on the welfare
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of natives in the OECD. At the other end, developing countries receive a net inflow
of workers. This increase in the labor force will induce a reduction in the productivity
cutoff for operating a firm there, and new firms will be established. However, these
are firms that did not find it worthwhile to operate before the inflow of new workers.
Thus, their positive contribution to welfare-adjusted equilibrium variety is minor.
Quantitatively, in the short run, what matters crucially is how much less productive
new entrants are relative to the firms that are already in the market. For this, the
calibration to the observed firm size distribution (Zipf’s Law) plays an important role.
Essentially, the observed firm size distribution contains information on the relative
productivity of the marginal firms compared to the inframarginal ones. The extremely
skewed firm size distribution observed in the economy implies that the inframarginal
firms are vastly more productive, and thus matter much more for welfare, than the
marginal ones (for a detailed exploration of this result, see di Giovanni and Levchenko
2013). In comparison, the main benefit in the long run from having a larger population
lies in the additional net entry of entrepreneurs—a larger nsi . An increase in population
stimulates entry everywhere in the productivity distribution. Because the long-run
entry will feature some very productive firms, it will have a much larger impact on
welfare.
Three OECD countries—Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States—gain in
welfare from undoing migration in the short run. It turns out that this outcome is due to
the assumption that immigrants receive a per capita share of firm profits. If we instead
assume that all the firm profits in the economy accrue to the natives, even in these three
countries the natives are worse off without immigration.
Figure 3 reports the short-run results graphically and isolates the roles of
remittances and international trade. As was the case in the long run, not taking
into account remittances, the relationship between population and welfare changes
becomes roughly monotonic. As illustrated by the hollow dots, with trade but no
remittances, larger population gains in the counterfactual lead to larger welfare losses
among developing countries. In the OECD the relationship appears practically flat.
In other words, in the short run the increase in domestic varieties experienced by
developing countries is not enough to compensate for the loss in imported varieties.
The main reason for this is that return migrants are leaving high-productivity OECD
countries to go back to their low-productivity countries of origin, which entails a large
loss in worldwide efficiency units of labor. Turning now to the role of international
trade, in the counterfactual exercise without either remittances or cross-border trade,
the relationship between population and welfare changes again becomes roughly linear
and now features a weak positive slope. This reflects the fact that the increased labor
force in the non-OECD will deliver a net increase in varieties available for consumption,
obviously with no change in imported varieties.
5.3. Distributional Effects
Our model features imperfect substitutability between skilled and unskilled workers,
and thus the potential for migration to generate distributional effects to the extent that
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FIGURE 3. Change in average welfare in the short run: autarky, trade, and remittances. This figure
reports the percentage change in welfare in the short-run counterfactual relative to the baseline
(assuming '`i D 'hi D 1 for all countries i ) in three different scenarios. Solid dots depict the welfare
change with both trade and remittances. Hollow dots depict the welfare change with international
trade but keeping remittances constant at zero in the baseline and counterfactual equilibria. Hollow
triangles depict the welfare changes under prohibitive trade costs and no remittances. The measure
of welfare is the average real income of the native stayers. On the y-axis is the percent change in the
population in the counterfactual relative to the baseline.
migrants differ in skill composition from natives. To isolate those distributional effects,
Figure 4 plots the welfare changes of the unskilled native stayers against the welfare
changes of the skilled native stayers. If a country observation is on the 45-degree line,
the skilled and the unskilled experience identical welfare changes.
The top panel presents the results for the OECD. Overall, welfare changes for
the skilled and the unskilled are similar: the observations tend to be relatively close
to the 45-degree line (Figure 4a). Thus, in the long run the welfare gains from new
varieties dominate the changes in the skill premium. A notable exception is Australia:
the unskilled stayers lose 13.6% in the no-migration counterfactual, compared to 7.8%
for the skilled. This reflects the fact that immigrants to Australia are more skilled on
average than natives (Table 1).
However, in the short run the distributional effects come to the fore (Figure 4b).
In many OECD countries, the welfare changes for the skilled and the unskilled have
opposite signs, and are an order of magnitude larger in absolute value than aggregate
welfare changes. For instance, in the short run the United States is 0.14% better off
without migration (Table 5). Separating by skill, it turns out that the unskilled are 1.03%
better off in the absence of migration, but the skilled are 0.45% worse off. In Australia,
the numbers are even larger, and the identity of winners and losers is reversed. While
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(a) OECD Countries, Long Run (b) OECD Countries, Short Run
(c) Non-OECD Countries, Long Run (d) Non-OECD Countries, Short Run
FIGURE 4. Distributional effects: welfare changes of skilled and unskilled natives. Units on both
axes are in percentage points. These figures present scatterplots of the percent change in welfare of
the unskilled native stayers against the change in welfare of the skilled native stayers, for the OECD
(top half) and the non-OECD (bottom half) countries respectively, in both the long run (left side) and
the short run (right side). The line through the data is the 45-degree line in each plot.
in the aggregate, Australia would be 0.68% worse off in the absence of migration,
unskilled Australians would be 2.28% worse off, while skilled Australians 2.63%
better off. The identity of winners and losers across countries corresponds closely to
the relative skill levels of natives and immigrants. In the United States, immigrants
are comparatively unskilled (Table 1), and thus in the short run migration benefits
the skilled at the expense of the unskilled. The opposite is true for Australia. This is
a general pattern: in the short run, the correlation between welfare changes for the
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skilled and the unskilled is negative at 0:22. (By contrast, in the long run the welfare
changes for those two groups are strongly positively correlated at 0.81.)
For the majority of non-OECD countries, the distributional effects are negligible
both in the short run and in the long run. This is intuitive: as discussed previously, for
these countries the welfare effects are dominated by remittances, which are the same
in the short and the long run. Only a couple of countries—Jamaica and Trinidad and
Tobago—exhibit large distributional effects. In these countries, reversing emigration
leads to large welfare losses for the skilled among the native stayers, with a much more
subdued (or even a positive) impact on the unskilled. Table 2 reveals that emigrants
from Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago are overwhelmingly more skilled than the
native stayers. These large disparities, coupled with large observed emigration, imply
that returning emigrants home to these countries will significantly change the relative
supply of skill there, leading to large distributional effects.
6. Extensions and Sensitivity
This section briefly discusses a number of extensions and sensitivity checks on the
main results. Online Appendix B describes these exercises in detail.
6.1. Native–Immigrant Productivity Differences
Migrant productivity may differ from that of the natives of similar skill levels for
a variety of reasons. On the one hand, it is well documented that migrants suffer a
reduction in human capital associated with imperfect transferability of skills across
countries, at least temporarily. If this is indeed the case, the findings described
previously may overstate the effects of migration on the effective labor force (in
efficiency units) of the host country. On the other hand, some immigrants may
be permanently more productive (i.e., earn higher wages) than natives with similar
schooling levels. This could be due to positive selection into migration: migrants may
be above-average in terms of unobservable skills (such as talent or ability) relative to
individuals that are observationally equivalent in terms of education, work experience,
gender, and so on. Of course, negative selection into emigration is also possible, and
the type of selection may well vary substantially by origin country.23 Online Appendix
B.1 presents two approaches to calibrating native–immigrant productivity gaps, and
shows that the results are quite similar to the baseline.
6.2. Imperfect Substitution Between Natives and Immigrants
The baseline framework assumes that native and immigrant workers in the same
skill category are perfect substitutes. Recently, several studies have questioned this
23. Borjas (1987) explores the conditions for one type of selection or the other to take place.
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assumption (Manacorda, Manning, and Wadsworth 2012; Ottaviano and Peri 2012).
Online Appendix B.2 implements a model in which natives and immigrants of the same
skill level are imperfect substitutes. As expected, assuming imperfect substitutability
between immigrants and natives increases the gains from immigration for the typical
host country since now natives and immigrants do not compete head to head. The
cross-country pattern of welfare changes is very similar to the baseline.
6.3. Additional Sensitivity and Welfare of Migrants
We examine the sensitivity of the main results along a number of additional dimensions.
First, the key mechanism through which natives in the destination countries gain
from migration is increased product variety. Since equilibrium variety responds
endogenously to market size, and larger markets exhibit greater equilibrium variety,
individuals living in larger markets enjoy greater welfare, all else equal. This
phenomenon is often referred to as the “scale effect”. Scale effects are common
and well studied in both economic growth (e.g., Romer 1990) and international trade
(e.g., Krugman 1980). Nonetheless, it is important to justify this type of mechanism in
our quantitative exercise, and to benchmark it to existing empirical estimates of scale
effects. Online Appendix B.3 (i) compares the magnitude of the scale effect implied
by our model to existing empirical estimates, (ii) implements an alternative calibration
that targets a scale effect at the bottom of the range suggested in the literature, and (iii)
implements a model with explicit congestion effects to counteract the positive effect
of country size on income.
Second, it may be that the share of the skilled in the population has a direct
effect on TFP. For instance, Jones (2002) and Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) develop
theoretical models that feature a positive link between human capital and TFP growth,
while Ciccone and Peri (2006), Moretti (2004), and Iranzo and Peri (2009b), among
others, provide estimates of these human capital externalities based on subnational
evidence. This force may affect the welfare impact of migration because the migrants
are frequently less skilled on average than the natives of their destination countries,
and more skilled than the staying natives of their origin countries.
Online Appendix B.4 discusses the results of an extension that incorporates
this effect. The results for the OECD remain qualitatively unchanged, whereas the
conclusions for the non-OECD turn out to be sensitive to the assumption that TFP
is not directly affected by the skilled share. Of course this outcome is very much
dependent on the specific parameterization we adopted. Since there is considerable
uncertainty regarding the nature of the link between the skilled share and TFP, these
results should be interpreted with caution. The exercise suggests that this is a potentially
important mechanism that should be explored further in future research.
In Online Appendix B.5, we use our baseline model to perform more realistic
policy counterfactuals. Specifically, we compute the welfare effects of reducing the
stock of immigrants in each country by 10%. We also evaluate the sensitivity of our
baseline results to assuming a much lower elasticity of substitution between skilled
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and unskilled labor. Finally, Online Appendix B.6 discusses the welfare impact of
migration on the migrants themselves.
7. Conclusion
The cross-border movements of people are large relative to the overall population
of many countries. This paper develops a global-scale quantitative assessment of the
welfare impact of migration in a large cross-section of both sending and receiving
countries. Our main finding is that the long-run impact of observed levels of migration
is large and positive for the remaining natives of both the main sending countries
and the main receiving ones. Relative to the counterfactual scenario in which no
migration takes place, some countries in both groups are as much as 10% better off.
Interestingly, while the overall numbers are similar, the salient reason for the welfare
changes is different. For the countries with the highest immigration rates (Australia,
New Zealand, Canada), migration raises welfare through increased equilibrium variety.
For the countries with the highest emigration rates (El Salvador, Jamaica), the staying
natives are better off because of remittances. These forces are also at work for all
other countries, but the relative strength of each varies substantially. Our findings
also suggest that failing to account for the role of remittances would produce a
welfare evaluation that would be severely biased for a number of migration-sending
countries.
All in all, our analysis provides a fairly positive view of the welfare effects of
international migration, both for origin and destination countries. We note, however,
that our analysis does not take into account the effects that immigration may have on
the provision of public goods and government-mandated redistribution. Implicitly, we
are assuming that immigrants contribute to tax revenue and use public services at the
same rate as the natives, and that immigrants do not alter the political equilibrium that
determines the overall degree of within-country income redistribution. While this may
be a reasonable assumption in some countries, it may not apply universally (Dolmas and
Huffman 2004; Ortega 2010). Relatedly, our analysis ignores any impact of migration
on social capital such as trust or social cohesion.24 Incorporating the fiscal, political,
and social channels into the quantitative welfare assessments of immigration remains
a fruitful avenue for future research.
24. De la Rica, Glitz, and Ortega (2014) provide a comprehensive survey of the economic effects of
immigration in Europe, including the fiscal consequences. Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) find that within
the United States, individuals living in localities with high ethnic fractionalization and income disparities
exhibit less trust. Using a large cross-section of countries, Ortega and Peri (2014) show that immigration
does increase ethnic fractionalization, but any negative economic effects of increased fractionalization
appear to be more than offset by other sources of gains.
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